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ABSTRACT 
This thesis introduces a Game-Theoretic Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission 
Planner (G-TAMP) that can quickly operate on a Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
computer without any software other than NMCI-standard Microsoft Office, Visual Basic 
for Applications (VBA), and a freely-available optimization package called LP-SOLVE 
employed as a dynamically linked library.  We replace the expensive and non-NMCI 
approved mathematical modeling software used by Adam Thomas in his 2008 thesis with 
a purpose-built, fast heuristic solver implemented in VBA.  This heuristic, called the 
Alternating Flows Heuristic, approximately solves the Thomas defender-
attacker/defender (D-A/D) model, thereby deploying both visible and secret anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) platforms around a high-value unit (HVU) to minimize the 
probability that a hostile diesel-electric submarine (SSK) penetrates these platforms 
undetected and reaches the HVU.  We analyze five scenarios and compare our heuristic 
solution with the optimal ones produced by Thomas’ D-A/D model. 
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In the summer of 2008, LT Adam Thomas presented the Game-Theoretic Anti-
Submarine Warfare Mission Planner (G-TAMP), an operational planning tool to 
determine the optimal placement of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) screening platforms 
around a high-value unit (HVU).  For example, the optimal placement of cruisers and 
destroyers around an aircraft carrier, given the characteristics of the water that the carrier 
traverses and sonar system performance of each screening platform.  This tool is 
comprised of a Microsoft Excel planner interface, a mathematical programming model 
implemented in the algebraic modeling language GAMS, and CPLEX, a commercial 
mixed-integer linear program solver. 
Unfortunately, G-TAMP in its current form cannot run on Navy Marine Corps 
Intranet (NMCI) computers because GAMS and the solver are not approved to run on 
NMCI systems.  We therefore modify G-TAMP to run completely in Excel using 
heuristic algorithms implemented in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and employing 
a freely-available optimization package, LP-SOLVE, as a dynamic linked library from 
VBA. The goal of our project is to develop a heuristic-based algorithm that 
approximately solves the underlying D-A/D model acceptably well while still running at 
relatively high speeds and on NMCI computers.   
We define “visible defender platforms” to be those ASW screening platforms 
easily observable by the enemy, such as surface ships, and other platforms employing 
active sonar and “secret defender platforms” to be those ASW screening platforms that 
remain hidden from the enemy, such as a friendly submarine employing passive sonar.  
Additionally, we define the problem of visible ASW screening platform assignments as 
the visible defender platform sub-problem and the problem involving the transit of a 
single hostile SSK towards a HVU, while avoiding detection, as the enemy SSK sub-




We present the Alternating Flows Heuristic, which operates through alternation 
between two complimentary stages.  The first stage utilizes network analysis to solve the 
visible defender sub-problem, identifying the best assignment of all visible defender 
platforms to acoustic modes and ASW missions.  Once this assignment is made, our 
heuristic solves the enemy SSK sub-problem through minimizing detection probability 
from all visible defender platforms along a single path to the HVU (shortest-path problem 
minimizing overall detection probability).  Our heuristic updates the visible defender 
platform sub-problem for ASW missions that intersect this path, solves the visible 
defender platform sub-problem again, and continues the alternation with another solve of 
the enemy SSK sub-problem.  This alternation continues until either a visible defender 
platform lay-down prevents an enemy SSK from utilizing an unopposed path to the HVU, 
or the heuristic reaches a planner-defined iteration limit.     
We supplement our heuristic’s first two stages with an additional stage that 
models Secret defender platforms as a two-person, zero-sum game (TPZSG).  Because of 
Excel 2007 limitations, this step can only be used if a single secret defender platform 
(i.e., friendly SSN) is deployed and available for mission tasking.  We formulate the 
TPZSG as a linear program and solve it via LP SOLVE, an open-source linear 
programming routine.  This suggests a “mixed strategy” of continuous probabilities used 
to produce the secret defender platform lay down and the resulting optimal attack paths of 
the enemy SSKs respectively.  When the planner deploys secret defender platforms, our 
heuristic uses the “mixed strategy” of optimal enemy SSK attack paths as the solution to 
the enemy SSK sub-problem (in lieu of shortest-path problem). 
Our heuristic algorithm implementation of G-TAMP runs on average 800% faster 
(8x faster) than the original G-TAMP, produces solutions that are on average within 78% 
of optimal, and runs completely in Excel, thereby allowing installation on NMCI 
computers.  Heuristic G-TAMP uses no licensed software other than NMCI Microsoft 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE G-TAMP DRAWBACK:  NMCI NON-COMPATIBILITY 
LT Adam Thomas (2008) presents the Game-Theoretic ASW Mission Planner (G-
TAMP), an operational planning tool to determine the optimal placement of screening 
(hereafter defender) platforms around a high-value unit (HVU).  For example, planners 
may use this tool to optimally deploy ASW screening platforms around an aircraft carrier, 
given the characteristics of the water and sonar system performance of each screening 
platform.  G-TAMP provides defensive plans that are optimal in the sense that they 
maximize the probability that the defender platforms will detect any inbound enemy 
SSK.  This tool comprises of a Microsoft Excel (2009) planner interface, a mathematical 
programming model implemented in the algebraic modeling language GAMS (GAMS 
2009), and CPLEX (2009), a commercial mixed-integer linear program solver. 
Unfortunately, the Thomas version of G-TAMP cannot run on U.S. Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet (NMCI) computers due to its use of GAMS and CPLEX, neither of which 
is approved to run on NMCI systems.  We modify G-TAMP to run completely in Excel 
using heuristic algorithms implemented in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) (2009) 
and employing a freely-available optimization package, LP-SOLVE (Berkelaar, 2009), as 
a dynamic linked library from VBA. 
In comparison to the $8,000 per-computer licensing fees for the use of GAMS and 
CPLEX, the VBA heuristic algorithms we present are free.  However, heuristic 
algorithms are not guaranteed to give optimal answers, but rather give feasible, and 
hopefully near-optimal, solutions.   
We use the original G-TAMP optimization to tune our heuristic by testing it with 
the five scenarios that Thomas presents to minimize the difference between our heuristic 
solutions and the optimal ones.  Similar to Thomas (2008), our goal is to provide 
defensive plans that maximize the probability of detecting enemy SSKs.  Throughout, we 
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develop the mathematics in terms of evasion probabilities and explicitly formulate our 
defender models to minimize enemy SSK evasion probability, and our attacker model to 
maximize this.      
B. DEFINING THE ASW PROBLEM:  THE G-TAMP LEXICON 
We adapt Thomas’s lexicon to describe the individual aspects of our updated  
G-TAMP program.  The following is drawn directly from the Thomas thesis.  The terms 
highlighted in italics describe the formal lexicon used in our work. 
1. Geography 
We partition a specific area of interest on the ocean into a Four-Whiskey (4W) 
grid.  The U.S. Navy utilizes these grids to coordinate operations on, above, or below the 
water surface.  Such grids vary in both cell length and width, and are stationary.  Typical 
cell sizes range between 5 nm and 10 nm per side.  In our models, we use index g to 
denote a grid cell.  An example of a 6x6 4W grid, taken from the Thomas thesis, is shown 
as Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   4W grid (From Thomas, 2008) 
A 4W grid cell is identified by its row letter and column number, e.g., C3.  Each black cell with a 
white “x” is impassable; all other cells are traversable.  The square-boxed region in the center 
(cells C3, C4, D3 and D4) denotes a set of protected cells. 
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A traversable cell denotes a location through which an enemy SSK may transit, or 
that a defender platform may patrol.  In contrast, impassable cells prevent passage by 
either an enemy SSK or defender platform, representing land or shoal waters.  We label 
each cell with an alphanumeric designator; for example, “F6” is the cell in the bottom 
right-hand corner of Figure 1. 
A traversable cell g connects to an adjacent traversable cell, denoted as g ′ , 
forming a directed arc ( , )g g′  in a network model.  An arc symbolizes potential feasible 
motion in either the horizontal, vertical, or diagonal directions for an enemy SSK.  For 
example, in Figure 1, an SSK could move from cell F4 to cells F3, E3, E4, or E5, but not 
to F5.   
A protected cell constitutes a traversable cell located such that an enemy SSK, 
having reached that cell, can stage an attack on the HVU.  Consequently, defender 
platforms must be located around the protected cells in order to prevent unobserved entry 
by the enemy SSKs.  We assume the HVU will reside and conduct operations within the 
region of protected cells.  We also assume that defender platforms cannot patrol inside 
the protected cells, but rather patrol around them thus providing protection to the HVU.  
This assumption follows from the fact that, once the enemy has closed to within weapons 
range, detection is near-useless.  We further assume that an attack by an enemy SSK can 
come from any protected cell, thus we desire to prevent unobserved entry into all 
protected cells.  A protected region comprises a grouping of these cells that we illustrate 
by the square-boxed region in the center of Figure 1.  We can accommodate more than 
one protected region in a 4W grid.     
2. Measure of Effectiveness 
Each ASW sensor employed by a defender platform has an effective detection 
range for an enemy SSK.  This detection range varies by sensor characteristics and 
system performance.  Twice this range defines the sensor’s sweep width and represents 
the detection capability of the sensor.  A second definition of sweep width, describes it as 
the area under the lateral range function p(x) of a particular sensor, a concept defined as 
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“the probability that the target will be detected if its track relative to the searcher is a 
straight line, infinitely long in both directions, with closest point of approach x” 
(Washburn, 2002, p. 4–1).    
In order to quantify our search effectiveness in locating enemy SSKs, we assume, 
following Washburn (personal communication, January, 2009), that a given defender 
platform requires a certain allotment of time to completely search each traversable cell.  
The product of the defender platform’s search speed and time spent in each traversable 
cell constitutes the platform’s search area, per unit time, in that traversable cell.  From 
this, we define coverage rate as the fraction of the area searched, per unit time, for each 
traversable cell: 
 ( )( )sweep width speedr
cell area
= . 
In reality, coverage rate depends on a multitude of other factors including, but not 
limited to: crew proficiency; environmental effects such as a cell’s water temperature 
distribution, sea-state, water depth, bathymetry, sea-life density; shipping density; and 
background noise (e.g., Urick, 1983).  Because coverage rates vary by defender platform-
sensor-cell combinations, we use a separate, precalculated coverage rate for each such 
combination. 
The search pressure in a given traversable cell results from the total amount of 
search effort being applied to that cell; i.e., the sum over all defender platform-sensor 
combinations taken for each traversable cell of the product of coverage rate and search 
time spent in that particular cell.  Well-searched traversable cells have “high pressures” 
and, thus, if the enemy can sense the search effort, he will seek paths that avoid such 
cells.  See Appendix A of Thomas (2008) for an explanation of how to convert a search 
pressure into a detection probability. 
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3. Enemy Course of Action 
We assume only one enemy SSK attempts to gain access to the protected 
region(s).  In reality, multiple enemy SSKs may make this attempt; however, protection 
from a single enemy SSK provides protection from any number of them.   
An enemy SSK attempts to reach some cell within the protected region(s), placing 
itself within weapons range of the HVU.  It accomplishes this by transiting from any 
location outside of the 4W grid, through the traversable cells, and eventually reaching a 
protected cell.  The goal of the enemy SSK is to maneuver in order to maximize the 
probability that it reaches any cell within the protected region(s), while remaining 
undetected.     
4. Friendly Course of Action 
Each defender platform is categorized into one of several types, and will search 
for enemy SSKs in the cells to which it is assigned.   
A visible defender platform can be observed by the enemy via visual sensors, 
acoustic sensors, or electronic surveillance measures.  A visible platform can be a surface 
vessel, maritime patrol aircraft, submarine employing active sonar systems, or any other 
type of platform utilizing active search thereby making itself detectable by an enemy 
SSK.  
In contrast, a secret defender platform remains hidden and therefore not 
observable to the enemy.  These platforms include friendly submarines that employ 
passive sonar systems.  An enemy SSK may have intelligence pertaining to the presence 
of secret defender platforms.  For example, a carrier battlegroup is conventionally 
accompanied by one or two escort submarines.  However, the exact location of a secret 
defender platform remains unknown to the enemy.  In addition, the planner may choose 
to employ two secret defender platforms, but wish to segregate them by separate patrol 
areas.  This concept, known as prevention of mutual interference (PMI), allows planners 
to utilize multiple submarines while minimizing the chance of an underwater collision 
between them.   
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A tethered defender platform, for example, a helicopter deployed from a surface 
ship, must always stay within range of its base defender platform.  Consequently, a 
tethered platform only performs missions within its tether range. 
A mission consists of one, two, or three contiguous cells in the 4W grid patrolled 
by an assigned defender platform, the time allotted for the search in each cell, and a 
sensor mode employed in the search (active or passive).  Viewing the 4W grid network as 
an undirected graph, we require that the cells that make up a mission, along with their 
associated connecting arcs, constitute a connected subgraph.  This ensures that individual 
missions contain groups of contiguous cells that are within close proximity to each other.  
We enumerate each subgraph containing up to three cells.  A subgraph becomes a 
potential mission as long as it complies with the planner’s requirements, which include 
platform speed, range, overall mission length, and pre-designated area restrictions (e.g., a 
submarine scheme to prevent mutual interference). 
C. ASSIGNING ASW DEFENDERS TO MISSIONS:  THE G-TAMP MODEL 
The Thomas G-TAMP, in its original form, employs a tri-level, defender-
attacker/defender optimization model (D-A/D) that minimizes the probability that any 
enemy submarine penetrates all defender platforms and attacks the HVU.  His model 
allows several enemy SSKs to attempt the approach to the HVU; as previously stated, our 
model assumes only one.  The Thomas version of this model is solved as a traditional 
mixed integer program (MIP), with an objective function composed of terms representing 
the contribution of search pressure to detect SSKs.  The first two parts to the model, the 
defender-attacker (D-A) portion, deal with the placement of visible defender platforms 
(i.e., destroyers, P-3s, and/or helicopters using active acoustic search methods, etc.) 
around the HVU, while each enemy SSK observes, reacts to evade detection, and chooses 
the minimum-risk route to the HVU.  The third part is an extension that allows the 
defender to use secret defender platforms (e.g., friendly submarines using passive 




HVU undetected.  The program suggests an optimal search plan, specifying the 
placement of all defender platforms around the HVU, and protecting it from worst-case 
enemy submarine attacks. 
The first two stages of Thomas’s G-TAMP model are optimally solved via 
decomposition, a series of alternating, sequential reactions between the visible defender 
platforms and the enemy SSKs.  In the Thomas implementation, the visible defender 
platforms seek to deploy themselves to maximize the search pressure they exert against 
the enemy SSKs.  The enemy SSKs in turn, observe this deployment and attempt to 
maneuver around the visible defender platforms to minimize the search pressure to which 
they are exposed.  Because of the sequential nature of these moves, this is a variant of a 
two-stage sequential game with perfect information represented as a defender-attacker 
(D-A) model (Brown, et al. 2006).  This provides a worst-case scenario in that the 
attacker realizes and reacts optimally to the entirety of the defensive lay down. 
In a third stage, Thomas expands on the D-A model to include secret defender 
platforms.  At first, these platforms were modeled in a true, tri-level defender-attacker-
defender model.  In this model, the secret defender platforms would respond after the 
attackers (enemy SSKs) had reacted solely based on the deployments of the visible 
defenders.  Thomas solved this model; however, the recommended optimal plans were 
unrealistic.  Specifically, if an enemy SSK was to have only one optimal path, then one or 
more hidden defenders would deploy to that one path to intercept.  If the attacker does 
not have complete knowledge of the environment, compared to the secret defender 
platforms, the attackers may choose sub-optimal paths, thereby avoiding the secret 
defender platforms by chance.  This suggests that both the secret defender platforms and 
the attackers have at least some knowledge concerning each other’s presence and the 
environment.  In addition, both the secret defender platforms and the attackers have a 
common, yet opposed objective: detection probability expressed linearly as additive 
search pressure.  The enemy SSKs still want to minimize the overall search pressure 
exerted against them while the secret defender platforms want to maximize their search 
pressure in conjunction with the visible defender platforms.   
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These two concepts led Thomas to employ a two-person, zero-sum game 
(TPZSG) with simultaneous play and perfect information.  Consequently, he develops the 
model called defender-attacker/defender (D-A/D), where the hyphen denotes sequential 
play and the forward slash signifies simultaneous play. 
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II. HEURISTIC TO SOLVE G-TAMP D-A/D MODEL 
A. ALTERNATING FLOWS HEURISTIC 
We introduce the Alternating Flows (AF) heuristic to solve G-TAMP.  AF 
alternates between applications of two complimentary models.  The first model is solved 
as a sequence of network models, each representing sequential assignment of a visible 
defender platform to a search mission to protect against any enemy SSK attack paths, 
followed by restrictions for following assignments, and then another assignment, until all 
defenders have been given missions.  The second models the optimal attack path for an 
enemy SSK, given a known defensive lay down.  
We make the following initial assumptions.  First, some defender platforms may 
have fixed missions, and we only re-assign those that do not.  All defender platforms 
contribute to overall detection probability.  Second, visible defender platforms fully 
deploy prior to the approach of any enemy SSK.  Third, the visible defender platforms 
and the enemy SSK have the same knowledge available to them concerning the situation 
(e.g., ocean environmental data, sensor performance, etc.).  Four, as previously stated, 
our model assumes only one enemy SSK attempts to gain access to the protected 
region(s). 
1. Enemy SSK Sub-Problem: Minimum-Risk Path  
We formulate and solve the sub-problem of routing an enemy SSK to the 
protected region(s), while avoiding visible defender platforms whose positions are given 
by a vector X  of visible defender platform mission assignments, as a shortest path 
problem.  The enemy SSK’s network represents cell-to-cell paths in the 4W grid with 
nodes representing cells and arcs representing allowed cell adjacency movements.  Figure 




Figure 2.   4W grid depicting potential enemy SSK attack paths 
Expanding on the previously defined 4W grid, we add an artificial start node, β, that is 
adjacent (i.e., connects to) each potential traversable entry cell along the outer edges of 
the 4W grid.  These cells then connect to other traversable cells forming paths that lead to 
the cells bordering the protected region (dashed box).  We add artificial arcs from each of 
the cells that border the protected region to an artificial end node, Ω.  Here, we illustrate 
four such paths (solid lines). 
Each potential SSK path can begin in an arc initiating from any designated origin 
cell on the border of the 4W grid, and culminate at a cell that borders the protected 
region.  An enemy SSK cannot traverse any of the impassable cells (i.e., cells 
representing a geographic obstacle preventing either defender platform or enemy SSK 
from operating).  To this network, we add an artificial supply node β and an artificial 
demand node Ω.  In addition, we add an arc from β to each allowable entry cell in the 4W 
grid and from each protected region(s) perimeter cell to Ω, with arc capacity defined the 
same as for the network interior arcs.  The search pressures, generated by the visible 
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defensive lay down influence the arc costs on the interior arcs of this network, a concept 
further explained in the formulation below.  We assign a capacity of one to each arc 
representing the traversal of a single enemy SSK. 
We want to model the approach of the enemy SSK as a shortest-path problem in 
which a longer paths represents a higher-search-pressure traversal for the SSK.  In order 
to avoid a situation in which there are several convoluted, but equally attractive, paths, 
we need to adjust the arc lengths so that, between any two paths with equal search 
pressures, the enemy SSK will prefer the one with the fewest arcs, and therefore the more 
direct route to the protected cells.  We accomplish this, similarly to Thomas, by 
introducing a parameter called battery that adds a small search pressure cost 
(subsequently increasing detection probability) for every arc traversed by the enemy 
SSK.      
a. Indices and Index Sets 
p P∈             set of all defender platforms (visible or secret)  
[alias p′ , p′′ ]. 
Visp P P∈ ⊆  set of all visible defender platforms [platform]. 
m M∈  potential enumerated missions [alias m′ , m′′ ] 
s S∈             sensor modes, with { } { }1 2, ,S s s active passive= ≡  
[alias s′ , s′′ ] 
g G∈   4W grid cells [alias g′ ] 
psm M M∈ ⊆  missions platform p can perform with sensor mode s 
pmg G G∈ ⊆  cells patrolled by visible defender platform p when 
executing mission m 
( , ) SSKg g A′ ∈  adjacency list specifying allowed SSK moves from grid cell 
g to grid cell g ′  
,SSK SSKg g
+ −  artificial start cell and terminal cell for SSKs, respectively 
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b. Data [Units] 
psgr  coverage rate of platform p using sensor mode s in grid cell 
g [ 1hr− ] 
pmsgX  time that visible defender platform p spends executing 
mission m using sensor mode s in grid cell g pre-computed 
based on coverage rates of cells pmg G∈ . [hr] 
battery  penalty incurred by an enemy SSK for traversing a single 
arc [pressure].   
gdist  distance from cell, g, to nearest cell within a protected 
region(s). 
d   weighting factor for distance penalty [ ]1/ *nm hr  
c. Variables [Units, if applicable] 
ggY ′  binary variable representing a single SSK that travels arc 
( , )g g′  [submarines] 
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In this case, the attacking SSK suffers all the search pressures exerted by the 
visible defending platforms, or just battery if no visible defender platform is present.  The 
search pressures resulting from the most recent defensive lay down X  determine the 
costs of the SSK network.  If an SSK traverses from cell A1 to B2, it will suffer a cost 
equal to that of the pressure being exerted on B2.  In the case of visible defender 
platforms only, the enemy SSK sub-problem network is solved to determine the path to 
the protected region(s) that offers the least amount of pressure (i.e., a shortest-path 
problem). 
2. Visible Defender Sub-Problem 
We solve the sub-problem of assigning visible defender platforms to missions as a 
sequence of minimum-cost network flow models, where each successive network model 
suggests for each unassigned platform an acoustic search mode and a particular mission.  
Among all suggested assignments, only the best one is adopted, and assigned.  The 
network is then restricted and conditioned to account for this latest assignment (including 
accounting for consequences of this assignment on consequent ones), and we repeat with 
another network model.  Figure 3 illustrates a generic visible defender platform network.   
The rationale behind solving successive network restrictions, fixing one visible 
defender platform assignment per solve, is that each of these network optimizations can 
be solved in negligible computation time, yet offer some omniscience in that each 
network solve returns the local optimal synergistic assignments of the restricted problem 
at hand.  That is, after some number of visible defender platforms have been assigned 
search modes and missions, the conditions facing the remaining platforms can be 
conditioned on this (thus accounting for constraints and computations that would 
otherwise require more general optimization tools) providing a restricted network 
successor to solve.  For each restricted model in this succession, from all suggested 
assignments, only the best is fixed, and we continue with more restricted models until 




network optimization, striking a balance between a purely myopic platform-by-platform 
assignment, and true optimization with all inter-platform relationships endogenously 
modeled. 
 
Figure 3.   Generic visible defender platform network 
Visible defender sub-problem network representation of Platforms, p, utilizing Sensor 
Modes, s, to accomplish Missions, m, to include artificial supply and sink nodes. 
We illustrate a generic version of the visible defender platform network in Figure 
3.  This network contains three echelons of nodes, one for the platforms, one for the 
possible acoustic modes, and one for missions.  Arcs denote feasible assignments from 
echelon to echelon and do not connect nodes within a given echelon.  In addition, we 
specify a unit capacity on each arc to prevent the assignment of more than one platform-
acoustic mode combination to any one particular mission.  To this three-layer network, 
we add an artificial supply node with a supply of p visible defender platforms, and an 
artificial sink node with a demand for p visible defender platforms.  We add an arc from 
the artificial supply node to each platform node, p, with unit capacity and we add an arc 
from each mission node, m, to the artificial sink node, again with unit capacity.  Each arc 
connecting a platform-acoustic mode node, (p,s), to a mission node, m, has a cost, C(p,s),m, 
equal to the evasion probability of an enemy SSK, determined by applying the random 














[ p ] 
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defender platform, resulting from this potential assignment.  All other arc costs are zero.  
We express this concept mathematically in the formulation below.   
Initially, this probability is conditional on the passage of an enemy SSK through 
at least one of the mission cells and is based on the environmental characteristics of the 
4W grid as given by the cells’ coverage rate.  When the enemy SSK sub-problem has 
been solved at least once, our heuristic estimates the probability that an enemy SSK 
passes through each cell.  Our heuristic combines this with the conditional probability of 
detection, given an enemy SSK is present, and results in the overall probability of 
detection. 
a. Additional Indices and Index Sets 
BASEp P P∈ ⊆   set of base defender platforms. 
TETHp P P∈ ⊆  set of tethered defender platforms where 
BASE TETHP P∩ = ∅  
( , ) TETH BASE TETHp p PP P P′ ′′ ∈ ⊆ ×  set defining each base and tethered defender 
platform pair 
i I∈  set of all nodes within the visible defender platform 
network (i.e., visible defender platforms p, acoustic 
modes s, missions m, artificial start and end nodes) 
[alias j J∈ ] 
( , ) VisDefi j A∈  adjacency list of all arcs in visible defender 
platform network specifying feasible combinations 
of visible defender platforms, acoustic modes, and 
missions for visible defender platforms. 
'
VisDef VisDefA A⊆    subset of visible defender platform network 
adjacency list specifying arcs specifically from each 
visible defender platform to acoustic mode. 
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''
VisDef VisDefA A⊆  subset of visible defender platform network 
adjacency list specifying arcs specifically from 
acoustic modes to enumerated missions. 
'''
VisDef VisDefA A⊆  subset of defending platform network adjacency list 
specifying arcs specifically from enumerated 
missions to a super end node built into the network. 
b. Additional Data [Units] 
pmtime  time on station for any defender platform p (visible 
or secret) when executing mission m [hr] 
PLATSn    number of visible defender platforms [platforms] 
PLATSn  maximum number of visible defender platforms that 
can search a given cell [platforms] 
m mrange ′ ′′  shortest straight-line distance between some cell in 
mission m′  and some cell in mission m′′  [nm] 
_ ′′pteth range  maximum range tethered defender platform ′′p can 
travel from its base defender platform before 
beginning a mission [nm] 
ptrans  time required for any platform p (visible or secret) 






,i jC  arc costs interior to visible defender platform 
network (by echelon) representing the evasion 
probability (via search pressure through random 
search model) of each feasible visible defender 
platform, acoustic mode, mission assignment.   
'
, 0 ( , )i j VisDefC i j A= ∀ ∈ ,
'''
, 0 ( , )i j VisDefC i j A= ∀ ∈ ,    
( ) ( ) ( )( ) '', , exp * , ,
pm
psg g pmsg VisDefp s m
g G
C r d dist X p s m A
∈
⎛ ⎞= − − ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
 
'ggY  vector containing enemy SSK sub-problem optimal 
solutions seen thus far.  This is treated as data from 
previous iterations. 
c. Additional Variables [Units, if applicable] 
,i jZ  variable representing one unit of flow through 
visible defender platform network indicating the 
selection of a specific platform, acoustic mode, or 
mission. 
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Our objective function (d0) expresses the evasion probability associated 
with each platform, acoustic mode, and mission combination.  Each constraint (d1) is a 
standard network conservation of flow constraint.  Each constraint (d2) sets an upper 
bound of one to every arc in this network.  Because each visible defender platform node 
has exactly one inbound arc, at most one unit of flow can pass through it and, 
consequently, at most one acoustic mode and mission can be selected for each visible 
defender platform.   
In addition to the (d1) and (d2) constraints, seven more exogenous 
constraints influence each successive visible defender network.  Thomas (2008) defines 
variables representing the assignment of visible defender platforms to acoustic modes and 
to missions as follows: 
e. New Variables (Thomas, 2008) 
pmsR  1 if platform p executes mission m using sensor 
mode s, 0 otherwise  
pmsgX  time that platform p spends executing mission m 
using sensor mode s in grid cell g [hr] 
He then formulates the following constraints on defender actions: 
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Each constraint (d3) requires a visible defender platform to choose, at 
most one mission.  Each constraint (d4) requires a visible defender platform to use only 
the available time on station for the chosen mission.  Each constraint (d5) requires a 
visible defender platform to patrol, for at least the amount of time required to transit all 
cells of a chosen mission.  Each constraint (d6) limits the number of visible defender 
platforms that can occupy a single grid cell.  Each constraint (d7) requires each tethered 
defender platform to choose a mission within the tether range of its base defender 
platform; variable domains (d8) require binary decisions. Each constraint (d9) requires 
non-negativity of the times spent on station. 
In each network solve, we refer to exogenous constraints (d3-d9) when 
restricting a successor network to reflect the consequences of a visible defender platform 
assignment.  Our network flow model for the visible defender platform network does not 
use the variable pmsR  explicitly.  However, a single unit of flow, within this network, 
from start node to end node represents the assignment of a particular visible defender 
platform p to a single acoustic mode s and a single mission m.  The set of all such flows 
in our network can therefore be interpreted directly as values for pmsR  (namely pmsR =1 
if there is a path from the start node, to visible defender platform p, then to acoustic mode 
s, then to mission m, culminating at the end node, and is zero otherwise) that are feasible 

















Figure 4.   Generic visible defender platform network showing pmsR  
In this figure, we graphically depict what 1pmsR =  means in our heuristic.  This example 
demonstrates a path (thick bold arrows) from the artificial supply node, to a visible 
defender platform p, to an acoustic mode assignment s, to a mission assignment m, and 
ending at the artificial sink node, with one unit of flow.  
Our heuristic calculates values for ,i jC  based on constraints (d4), (d5), and 
(d9) prior to building and solving the visible defender platform network in the following 
manner.  Our heuristic calculates values for pmsgX , conditional on the choice of mission, 
for each platform, p, using acoustic modes, s, based on cell coverage rates via the 








X time trans trans
r
∈
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
  . 
This equation establishes a mathematical relationship between constraints 
(d4), (d5), and (d9), satisfying each one implicitly.  Given a solution to our visible 
defender network flow model, we can calculate the corresponding values of pmsR , as 
defined above.  These values, along with the values of pmsg pmsgX X=  for the nonzero 
assignments pmsR  (and 0pmsgX =  for the zero values of pmsR ), constitute a feasible 
solution to constraints (d3) through (d9).  Therefore, our visible defender platform 
network flow model provides feasible solutions to the Thomas D-A/D model.     
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It is important to make the distinction that our pmsgX values are pre-
computed prior to the alternation between the visible defender network flow model and 
the enemy SSK network flow model.  Unlike Thomas, who expresses pmsgX  
as a 
decision variable thus allowing it to change, our pmsgX values do not change and we use 
them as data for the rest of the heuristic, in that, we use them to calculate ,i jC  values in 
accordance with the equation shown in the additional data section (chap. II, section A, 
subsection 2, part a.).   
To satisfy constraint (d6), our heuristic checks to see if any cells contain a 
number of platforms equal to this platform per cell limit; if this limit has been reached we 
prohibit assignment of missions containing these cells (setting associated capacities to 
zero).  After each successive restricted network solve, our heuristic checks the resulting 
visible defender platform-acoustic mode-mission combination to determine if this 
particular visible defender platform is tethered to another visible defender platform.  If 
so, then we restrict the visible defender’s network for only this unassigned tethered 
defender platform (or base defender platform if applicable) to prevent the choice of 
missions outside the associated tether range, thereby enforcing the (d7) constraint.  
We solve these network flow models with a VBA rendition of GNET 
(Bradley, et al. 1977).  Solve times for networks with 444 nodes and 5,930 arcs are 
negligible. 
Once our heuristic solves the SSK sub-problem more than once, resulting 
in the accumulation of at least one enemy SSK path; it adjusts the costs of the acoustic 
mode to mission arcs of the visible defender platform network to reflect the probability of 
an enemy SSK passing through any of the respective mission cells.  We represent the 
total search pressure applied to a given mission, m, by the term msearcheffectiveness .  We 
represent the detection probability of an enemy SSK in at least one of the cells of a given 
mission, m, by det ( )P m .  We represent the conditional probability of detection, per 
mission, given that a hostile SSK is present in at least one cell of that mission 
by det ( )P m SSK m∈ .  We represent the probability of hostile SSK presence in at least one 
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mission cell by the term ( )P SSK m∈ .  We set the conditional 
probability, det ( )P m SSK m∈  equal to: ( )exp m1- search effectiveness− based on a random 
search model.  Our heuristic derives an estimate of ( )P SSK m∈  in two parts.  It 
generates a frequency distribution of the number of times an SSK transits a particular cell 
and divides this number by the total number of times an SSK transits all cells, thus 
creating an enemy SSK probability field (by cell).  From this probability field, we 
calculate the detection probability of a given mission, based on the detection probabilities 
of its individual cells, and represent this by the term subusesm.  
We set ( )det det( ) ( )*P m P m SSK m P SSK m= ∈ ∈ .  Substituting subusesm 
for ( )P SSK m∈ , det ( )P m  becomes: ( )( )expm msubuses 1- search effectiveness  − .  The 
probability of evasion is one minus this: 
( )( )1 expm m1- subuses  search effectiveness− − =
( )*expm m m1- subuses +subuses searcheffectiveness− .  The first two additive terms are 
exogenous constants, while the last is discretionary.  Thus, we allocate 
searcheffectivenessm and minimize the probability of evasion by 
minimizing ( )*expm msubuses search effectiveness− .  Therefore, the updated costs in the 
defender sub-problem network are: 
( ) ( )( ) '', , *exp , ,
pm
m psg pmsg VisDefp s m
g G
C subuses r X p s m A
∈
⎛ ⎞= − ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . 
Occasionally, solutions to the defender sub-problem will assign platforms 
to missions whose cells are more distant than desired from those of the protected 
region(s).  Carrier battlegroup commanders typically want their screening platforms close 
to the HVU (i.e., carrier) for air defense operations.  Consequently, we adjust the 
coverage rate per cell in a manner inversely proportional to the distance of that cell from 
the cells of the protected region(s).   
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Accordingly, the adjustment to the updated costs in the defender sub-
problem network becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) '', , *exp * , ,
pm
m psg g pmsg VisDefp s m
g G
C subuses r d dist X p s m A
∈
⎛ ⎞= − − ∀ ∈⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
where d is a discretionary constant chosen by the user representing the tradeoff between 
coverage rates and distances.  In the results we report in chapter III, d is taken to be 
0.01[ ]1/ *nm hr .   
In addition, at each network restriction iteration, a Bayesian probability 
update, is performed on the evasion probabilities for missions of all other non-assigned 
visible defender platforms to reflect the potential combination of these platforms with 
already-assigned visible defender platforms.  We apply this update to the non-assigned 
missions containing cells common to those of the most recent visible defender platform-
acoustic mode-mission assignment.  Once all visible defender platforms are assigned to 
missions utilizing an acoustic mode, our heuristic updates the 4W grid with all platform 
assignments and subsequent search pressures assigned to each cell.  Cells where no 
defending platform is assigned, are given a search pressure equivalent to the battery 
penalty.   
3. General Heuristic 
Our heuristic uses the cell coverage rates to initially solve the succession of 
restricted visible defender networks that collectively represent the visible defender 
platform sub-problem.  Our heuristic uses the solution of each to fix the best platform, 
acoustic mode, and mission, and update data for the next, restricted sub-problem.  
Expanding on this concept, the complete visible defender network solution (after all 
restricted network solves, per Alternating Flows Heuristic iteration) creates a known 
search pressure in each visible defender platform-occupied cell.  This generates an initial 
feasible assignment of visible defender platforms to acoustic modes (passive or active) 
and to missions based solely on the cell coverage rates (supplied by planner).   
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To avoid this initial visible defender platform lay down, the attacker intelligently 
routes his SSK minimizing exposure to total search pressure along a path from some 
entry cell of the 4W grid to the protected region(s).  Our heuristic updates the visible 
defender platform network using the enemy SSK path in accordance with the Cs,m 
equation (chap. II, section A, subsection 2, p. 22) and continues to alternate between 
solving the enemy SSK (attacker) shortest path problem, updating the visible defender 
platform network, and solving the visible defender platform sub-problem.  An overall 
description of our heuristic follows. 
Step 1:  Set iteration counter (IC) of heuristic to zero. 
Step 2: Determine an initial feasible assignment of visible defender platforms, 
acoustic modes, and missions based on cell coverage rates (X) (described above).  Set 
incumbent solution equal to this assignment, send X data to enemy SSK’s network thus 
becoming (X) , update costs on all arcs of enemy SSK’s network by the search pressure 
values corresponding to (X) . 
Step 3:  Solve SSKSP( )X for Y (enemy SSK paths).  Send Y data to visible 
defender’s network thus becoming (Y) .   
Step 4:  Update subusesm for all (Y) seen thus far. 
Step 5:  Update ,s mC  values based on subusesm.   
Step 6:  Solve DEFEND for X.  Collect X assignments as (X)  and current 
iteration number. 
Step 7:  Solve SSKSP( )X for Y (enemy SSK paths).  Send Y data to visible 
defender’s network thus becoming (Y) . 
Step 8:  If stopping criterion met (described after step 10 below), Go to Step 9.  If 
not, Go to Step 4.      
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Step 9: Allow planner to make choice of using current iteration (X)  and (Y)  or 
continuing the heuristic to find a better solution.  If planner chooses to continue, Go to 
Step 5.  If planner chooses to use current solution, Go to Step 8.   
Step 10:  Print (X)  as best defense solution found, (Y)  as best enemy SSK path 
found, and iteration number associated with best (X)  and (Y) . 
The stopping criterion mentioned in Step 8 is based upon creating a “barrier” of 
patrolling visible defender platforms in the cells bordering the protected region(s).  Once 
our heuristic assigns all visible defender platforms to missions, it solves the enemy SSK 
shortest-path problem.  If the solution to this problem illustrates that the enemy SSK 
penetrates through to the protected region(s) without encountering a defender platform, 
then we fail to protect the HVU; if our heuristic has not exceeded a user-defined iteration 
limit (currently set to 700) then it continues to look for a better solution.  However, if an 
enemy SSK cannot penetrate through to the protected region(s) without encountering a 
defender, then we have successfully achieved this criterion, and the heuristic reports this 
solution to the planner (Step 9). 
B. POSITIONING A SINGLE SECRET DEFENDER 
The heuristic described above develops a viable screen of visible defender 
platforms around an HVU to minimize the probability of an attack on the HVU. 
However, this assumes that the attacker observes all ASW defensive positioning, which 
may be too conservative for the defender when planners deploy secret defender 
platforms.   
As mentioned previously, G-TAMP optimally deploys secret defender platforms, 
for instance friendly submarines using passive sonar, in addition to those using active 
sonar (visible defender platforms).  Thomas describes the importance of properly 
modeling this situation via a two-person, zero-sum game (TPZSG) with simultaneous 
play.   
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To implement this game, we begin by enumerating a TPZSG payoff matrix where 
the row space consists of potential secret defender platform missions and the column 
space consists of available enemy SSK paths from the entry cells of the 4W grid to the 
protected region(s).  Any row-column intersection in this matrix represents the effect of 
the already-placed visible defender platforms, as well as the potential effect of the secret 
defender platform for cells that are common to that particular secret defender platform 
mission and enemy SSK path.  The defender platforms (visible or secret) want to 
maximize this quantity while the enemy SSK wants to minimize it. 
Because of the limitations of internal data structures within Excel 2007, only a 
single platform can patrol as a secret defender platform.  The TPZSG setup enumerates 
all feasible secret defender platform missions, based on the same mission requirements as 
visible defender platforms.  We represent the total number of these missions by the term 
Ф.  Secret defender platform mission enumeration, when applied to just two defender 
platforms, requires an Δ(Δ-1) matrix where Δ ≡ Φ .  This very quickly causes a memory 
overflow problem and crashes Excel 2007.   
We formulate the TPZSG as a linear program, as shown by Washburn (Washburn, 
1994, p. 37), maximizing the value of the secret defender’s game.  We use a VBA 
compiled version of LP SOLVE (Berkelaar, 2009) to solve the game and discover the 
secret defender platform mission assignment probabilities (from the primal variables’ 
values), and enemy SSK path utilization probabilities (from the dual variables’ values) 
(Washburn, 1994, p. 19–20).  The non-zero probability results, for either the secret 
defender platform or the enemy SSK, form a strategy used to form the solution to the 
enemy SSK sub-problem (in lieu of SSKSP( )X ) and vice-versa for the secret defender 
platform.  A detailed description of this algorithm follows.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, we refer to a single secret defender platform SECRETSSN P∈ .  For this platform 
to remain secret, recall that the only possible choice of acoustic mode, s, is PASSIVE S∈ . 
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1. Additional Indices and Index Sets 
b B∈  set of potential allowable enemy SSK routes from the entry 
cells of the 4W grid to the cells bordering the protected 
region(s). 
 
,SSN PASSIVEm M∈  set of potential enumerated missions executable by secret 
defender platform patrolling in passive acoustic mode  
[alias m′ ].  Also, to prevent mutual interference between 
submarines: , ,SSN PASSIVE SSN ACTIVEm M m M∈ ∩ ∈ =∅   
pmbg G G∈ ⊆  set of cells visible defender platform Visp P∈  patrols while 
executing mission m that are common to enemy SSK route 
b. 
2. Data [Units] 
psgr  coverage rate of defender platform p using sensor mode s in 
grid cell g   [ 1hr− ] 
pmsgX  time that visible defender platform Visp P∈ spends 
executing mission m using sensor mode s in grid cell g pre-
computed based on coverage rates of cells pmg G∈  
(described below). [hr] 
 
, , ,SSN m PASSIVE gW ′     time that secret defender platform SECRETSSN P∈  spends 
executing mission m using passive acoustic mode in grid 
cell g pre-computed based on  coverage rates of cells 
pmg G ′∈ [hr]. 
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fm,b probability that a single enemy SSK traversing path, b, is 
detected if defender employs mission, m [probability].  
3. Additional Variables [Units] 
mQ  probability that secret defender platform SECRETSSN P∈  
executes covert mission m using passive acoustic mode 
[probability] 
bπ  probability that an enemy SSK chooses route b 
[probability] 
ν    the value of the two person, zero sum game 
4. Max-Min/Max Optimization of Detection Probability along Attacker’s 
Path 
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Similar to the visible defender platform sub-problem, two more exogenous 
constraints influence the secret defender platform assignments.  Thomas (2008) defines 
variables representing the assignment of secret defender platforms to acoustic modes and 
to missions as follows: 
5. New Variables (Thomas, 2008) 
pmsQ  probability that platform SECRETp P∈  executes covert mission 
m using sensor mode s [probability] 
pmsgW  expected amount of time platform ∈ SECRETp P  spends 
executing covert mission m using sensor mode s in cell g [hr] 
He then formulates the following constraints on defender actions 
6. Constraints on Defender’s Secret Platforms (Thomas, 2008) 
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These constraints “require the same of the secret platforms as their visible 
counterparts, with the exception that Q is now continuous” (Thomas, 2008, p. 25). 
In this case, pmsQ  represents the continuous probability of a secret defender 
platform being assigned to a secret defender platform mission utilizing acoustic mode s.  
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In the Thomas model, recall that multiple defender platforms can choose between being 
visible or secret.  Because of the limitations in Excel discussed earlier, our heuristic is 
incapable of assigning more than one secret defender platform.  Therefore, our heuristic 
satisfies each (d10’) constraint implicitly.  
Our heuristic calculates values for , , ,SSN m PASSIVE gW ′ in a similar manner to that of 
pmsgX .  In the case of pmsgX , the equation is conditional on the choice of a particular 
mission, that is, each respective mission contains cells with varying coverage rates that 
influences the respective pmsgX values.  Despite the fact that mission choice is not a 
binary ( pmsQ  vice pmsR ), the same mathematical equation used to generate pmsgX applies 
to generating , , ,SSN m PASSIVE gW ′ because the equation is still conditional on respective 
mission choices, that is, calculated values of , , ,SSN m PASSIVE gW ′ are conditional on the 
choice of that particular mission, executed by the secret defender platform utilizing 
passive sonar, based on cell coverage rates.  Therefore, we use the following formula to 
calculate those values: 
( ), ', , * .
p m
p sg
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Our definition of ,m bf  uses these , , ,SSN m PASSIVE gW ′  values (along with pmsgX values) to 
generate detection probabilities conditional on the choice of each feasible secret defender 








III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter evaluates our heuristic alteration of G-TAMP by comparing with the 
Thomas D-A/D model results solved to within a 5% optimality gap.  Thomas utilizes an 
assortment of five examples to demonstrate the validity of his D-A/D model.  We 
compare our results to his by solving the same five examples.   
We use six of the seven fundamental scenario assumptions that Thomas used: 1) 
active sonar mode always offers better performance than passive in each cell; 2) each 
platform spends four hours on station for mission accomplishment; 3) we enumerate all 
possible one-, two-, or three-contiguous cell missions for each defender platform; 4) all 
4W grid cells are 5 nautical mile (nm) by 5 nm in size; 5) when a helicopter is employed 
in a scenario, it is tethered to a specified base platform (e.g., Helo2 is tethered to Surf2); 
and 6) the enemy SSK transits a searched cell in 1.5 Hrs at 4 knots.   
In each of the five scenarios, we compare our results to those of Thomas, based 
on overall detection probability, solution run time, and heuristic achievement percent of 
the optimal detection probability results (D-A/D model program results).  For run time 
comparisons, we use the same 3.13 GHz processor computer to run all five scenarios in 
both the original Thomas G-TAMP and our heuristic G-TAMP.   
In each of the examples, Thomas sets one included SSN to flexible, that is, a 
defender platform allowed to be either visible or secret determined by the D-A/D model.  
Our heuristic handles secret defender platforms by programming the TPZSG and solving 
it with LP SOLVE separately from the visible defender platform sub-problem, so we 
cannot automatically determine visible versus secret for defender platforms as the 
optimal D-A/D model does.  Because of this, we repeat examples one, three, four, and 




A. EXAMPLE ONE:  BASIC SCENARIO 
In the first scenario, we set up the 6x6 4W grid shown in Figure 5 
 
 
Figure 5.   Basic scenario, 4W grid geography (From Thomas, 2008) 
For this scenario, cells C3, C4, D3, and D4 (boxed) comprise the region of protected 
cells; cells A2, F5, and F6 are impassable. 
We assume a non-homogenous ocean environment for this scenario; depicted 
graphically in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Basic scenario, coverage rates (From Thomas, 2008) 
Friendly platforms can search light-colored cells more easily than dark-colored ones.   
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For this scenario, we deploy a total of six defender platforms, testing the platform 














SSN1 Visible  
Table 1.   Basic scenario, available defender platforms 
Our heuristic deploys defender platforms around the protected region, shown in 
Figure 7 with corresponding mission details in Table 2.  We display the heuristic results 
from the scenario that utilizes SSN1 in active mode, consistent with the optimal D-A/D 
model results. 
 
Figure 7.   Basic scenario, defender platform lay down (Heuristic) 
In this scenario, the defender platforms form a tight screen around the HVU and then 
position themselves to maximize their enemy SSK detection probabilities based on all 
enemy SSK paths seen thus far from all iterations. 
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 Surf1 m76 Surf2 m77 Surf3 m83 Helo1 m138 P31 m92 SSN1 m100
Active Active Active Active Active Active
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time
B5 1.38 B6 1.47 D2 1.38 A3 1.11 E3 1.50 B2 1.25
C5 1.42 C6 1.40 E2 1.40 A4 1.40 E4 1.17 B3 1.33
D5 1.19 D6 1.13 F2 1.21 B4 1.49 E5 1.33 C2 1.42  
Table 2.   Basic scenario, defender platform mission details (Heuristic) 
For this scenario, each platform patrols in the active acoustic mode in each of the 
missions shown above.  In each mission, each platform spends the shown time above (in 
hours) to patrol for an enemy SSK. 
Our heuristic produces an overall detection probability of 0.24 and runs in 50 
seconds compared to the optimal D-A/D model that produces a detection probability of 
0.41 and runs in 26 seconds.  Our heuristic achieves 59% of optimality. 
When we run the same scenario with SSN1 as a secret defender platform, the 
heuristic achieves a detection probability of 0.29 in 44 seconds.  This is within 71% of 
the optimal solution.     
B. EXAMPLE TWO: SHORT-HANDED SCENARIO 
In this case, we test the simple scenario of one visible defender platform and one 
secret defender platform.  We use the same geography and ocean environment as in 
Example One.  We fix SSN1 as a secret defender platform.  We show the defensive 
platform set up in Table 3. 
 Platform Type
Surf1 Visible
SSN1 Secret  
Table 3.   Short-handed scenario, available defender platforms 
Figure 9 shows our heuristic solution with corresponding mission detail in Table 





Figure 8.   Short-handed scenario, D-A/D model results (From Thomas, 2008) 
The D-A/D model employs a “mixed strategy” for the SSN and a three-cell mission for 
the single visible defender. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Short-handed scenario, defender platform lay down (Heuristic) 
Two visible defender platforms, executing at most three cell missions, cannot possibly 
cover the entire protected region perimeter.  We employ a secret defender platform 
(SSN1) with a mixed strategy to randomize its actions and a visible defender platform 




Active Prob. 0.03 Prob. 0.02 Prob. 0.01
Cell Time B4 4.00 D2 4.00 B4 1.84
B2 1.22 B5 2.16
B3 1.33
C2 1.45 Prob. 0.04 Prob. 0.05 Prob. 0.13
E3 2.18 E2 1.63 E3 1.42
E4 1.82 E3 1.25 E4 1.25
E4 1.12 E5 1.33
Prob. 0.16 Prob. 0.31 Prob. 0.25
D2 1.42 E4 1.22 B4 1.23
E2 1.44 D5 1.47 B5 1.37
E3 1.14 E5 1.31 C5 1.40  
Table 4.   Short-handed scenario, defender platform mission details (Heuristic) 
In this case, Surf1, a visible defender platform, selects a single mission as shown.  SSN1, 
a secret defender platform, utilizes a mixed strategy (Probabilities in bold) which 
randomizes its actions.  
In this scenario, two visible defender platforms cannot possibly patrol the entire 
protected region perimeter due to the three-cell limit of visible defender platform 
enumerated missions.  If SSN1 patrols in active acoustic mode, then it is visible and 
executes enumerated missions as such.  If this occurs, the enemy SSK would observe the 
location of both visible defender platforms and take an un-opposed path to the protected 
region, thereby reaching the HVU.  Therefore, SSN1 remains secret, thereby randomizing 
its patrol pattern and remaining unpredictable to the enemy SSK.  Similarly, the enemy 
SSK randomizes their actions consequently remaining unpredictable to the defenders.  
Our heuristic produces an overall detection probability equal to the D-A/D 
model’s optimal detection probability of 0.12 and runs in 5 seconds compared to the D-
A/D model that runs in 23 seconds. 
C. EXAMPLE THREE:  OCEAN-INFLUENCE SCENARIO 
Our third scenario focuses on ocean-influence.  The cells forming the perimeter of 
the protected region contain water with relatively low coverage rates compared to cells 
outside of the perimeter.  We use the same geography as examples one and two with the 
only difference being an update to the cell coverage rates shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.   Ocean-influence scenario, coverage rates (From Thomas, 2008) 
The protected region is surrounded by cells with low coverage rates, as would be the case 
if the HVU took station near an ocean current (e.g., the Gulf Stream or Kuroshio) or near 
an ocean front (for background on the ocean environment, see Pickard and Emery 1990). 
We show the list of available defenders in Table 5.  Similar to example one, we 
tether Helo1 to the base platform Surf1.   
Platform Type Platform Type
Surf1 Visible Surf1 Visible
Surf2 Visible Surf2 Visible
Surf3 Visible Surf3 Visible
Helo1 Visible Helo1 Visible
P31 Visible P31 Visible
SSN1 Secret SSN1 Visible  
Table 5.   Ocean-influence scenario, available defender platforms 
With SSN1 selected as a secret defender platform, our heuristic produces an 
overall detection probability of 0.15, runs in twelve seconds compared to the optimal D-
A/D model’s run time of 3 hours, and achieves 68% of optimality based on the D-A/D 
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model’s result of 0.22.  Furthermore, when we run our heuristic with SSN1 selected to be 
a visible defender platform, the results show a feasible visible defender platform lay 
down, but with a lower overall detection probability equal to 0.09 and run time of 1 
minute.  
We present our heuristic defensive lay down, and subsequent mission details, in 
Figure 12 and Table 6, respectively.  We choose to illustrate the results with SSN1 as a 
secret defender platform to compare to the optimal D-A/D results, which we show in 
Figure 11.   
 
Figure 11.   Ocean-influence scenario, D-A/D optimal results (From Thomas, 2008) 
The D-A/D model prescribes a ‘ring’ of platforms around the HVU, but places search 




Figure 12.   Ocean-influence scenario, defender platform lay down (Heuristic) 
The non-uniform sound propagation in this scenario forces defensive platforms to spread 
out more from the protected region.  An Enemy SSK takes advantage of these conditions 
and will preferentially choose cells with low coverage rates because defender platforms 
are less likely to be there. 
 Surf1 m124 Surf2 m89 Surf3 m85 Helo1 m79 P31 m123
Active Active Active Active Active
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time
B2 1.78 B4 0.83 A4 0.97 C2 1.76 E3 1.48
A3 1.19 B5 0.90 A5 0.97 D2 1.16 F3 1.26
B3 1.03 B6 2.27 A6 2.06 E2 1.08 F4 1.26
SSN1
Prob. 0.56 Prob. 0.08 Prob. 0.15 Prob. 0.04 Prob. 0.14 Prob. 0.02
C6 1.24 A4 1.32 C5 0.82 E4 1.11 F3 1.28 C5 0.77
D6 1.38 A5 1.32 C6 2.07 E5 1.86 E4 1.43 C6 1.50
E6 1.38 B4 1.35 D5 1.11 F4 1.03 F4 1.28 D6 1.72  
Table 6.   Ocean-influence scenario, defender platform mission details (Heuristic) 
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Here we see divergence from the optimal D-A/D model.  The optimal model is 
omniscient, in that it simultaneously places all defender platforms, maximizing their 
simultaneous, synergistic probability of detection as expressed in the linear objective.  By 
contrast, our heuristic is myopic, sequentially positioning defender platforms based on 
detection probability estimates achieved by alternating between successive visible 
defender platform network restrictions and an enemy SSK network flow model.  Our 
heuristic attempts to approximate myopically through Bayesian probability updating what 
the optimal model states exactly.   
Our heuristic uses the running frequency distribution of enemy SSK path cells 
seen thus far to apply the Bayesian probability updates to the appropriate visible defender 
platform network costs (cost on arcs between acoustic mode s and missions m).  Our 
heuristic generates this frequency distribution by either the enemy SSK shortest path 
problem (when only visible defender platforms are present) or by the TPZSG solved from 
the enemy SSK’s perspective (secret defender platforms and visible defender platforms 
present).  In this scenario, this frequency distribution produces estimates of enemy SSK 
cell presence probability, whose magnitudes dominate those of the conditional 
probability of detection based on the cell’s coverage rate.   
Therefore, the estimate of enemy SSK cell presence probability affects the overall 
detection probability more so than the conditional probability of detection based on the 
associated cell’s coverage rate.  An analysis of the frequency distribution (which is one of 
the outputs to our model) supports this deduction, allowing us to ascertain why certain 
platforms seem to favor cells with comparatively low coverage rates.  The analysis shows 
defender platforms (visible or secret) patrolling cells with relatively low coverage rates 
because of a remarkably higher estimate of enemy SSK cell presence.  We believe this 
explains why our results show defender platforms patrolling cells with relatively low 
coverage rates or cells that are far away from the protected region. 
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D. EXAMPLE FOUR:  MULTIPLE-HVU SCENARIO 
In this scenario, we model the situation where two carrier battle groups occupy 
two separate protected cells and compare to the optimal D-A/D model results.  We 
expand the 4W grid to an 8x8 grid, with two protected regions, shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.   Multiple-HVU scenario, 4W grid geography (From Thomas, 2008) 
The defender stations one HVU in each of two geographically-separated, protected cells 
(F3, C6), and must allocate defensive platforms among them. 
For this scenario, we assume the cell coverage rates (as does Thomas) illustrated 




Figure 14.   Multiple-HVU scenario, coverage rates (From Thomas, 2008) 
As before, the defender can easily search light-colored cells, while dark cells are harder 
to search.  The defender wisely places his carrier battlegroups in easily-searched water to 
facilitate detection of approaching SSKs. 
We use the same available defender set-up as Thomas’s example four, with one 
exception.  Because of the previously discussed limitations of internal data structures 
within Excel 2007, we only allow SSN1 to patrol as a secret defender platform.  We 









SSN2 Visible  
Table 7.   Multiple-HVU scenario, available defender platforms 
 
 43
We tether the helicopters (Helo1 and Helo2) to base platforms Surf1 and Surf2 
respectively.  In addition, we restrict SSN1 and SSN2 to patrol in their respective PMI 
schemes shown in Figure 15.        
 
Figure 15.   Multiple-HVU scenario, allowed cells for SSNs (After Thomas, 2008) 
To prevent interference between the submarines, SSN2 must remain in its assigned area 
(dark-shaded cells on lower left), while SSN1 must stay in the light-shaded cells at upper 
right.  The original Thomas set up reversed the placement of these submarines such that 
SSN1 patrols in the dark-shaded cells while SSN2 patrols in the light-shaded cells.  In 
order to produce results consistent with Thomas, our secret defender (SSN1) must patrol 
the upper right protected cell. 
Our heuristic algorithm achieves an overall detection probability of 0.35 and runs 
in 21 minutes, as compared to the optimal D-A/D model’s result of 0.48 and run time of 2 
minutes.  Our heuristic achieves 73% of optimality.  Figure 16 shows our defender 
platform lay down with associated mission detail shown in Table 8.  
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Figure 16.   Multiple-HVU scenario, defender platform lay down (Heuristic) 
In this case, two separate groupings of defender platforms patrol around protected regions 
C6 and F3.  The secret defender platform, SSN1, plays a mixed strategy to protect C6, 
while SSN2 patrols as a visible defender platform.   
 Surf1 m331 Surf2 m277 Surf3 m391 Helo1 m197 Helo2 m171 P31 m228 SSN2 m418
Active Active Active Active Active Active Active
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time
G2 1.4696 E2 1.279 B6 1.2847 E4 1.6899 A5 1.3187 D5 1.2386 G3 1.496
H2 1.3645 E3 1.3696 B7 1.3212 F4 1.3843 B5 1.3407 D6 1.3381 G4 1.285
H3 1.1659 F2 1.3514 C7 1.3942 G4 0.9259 C5 1.3407 D7 1.4233 H4 1.219
SSN1
Prob. 0.39 Prob. 0.04 Prob. 0.39 Prob. 0.06 Prob. 0.06 Prob. 0.04 Prob. 0.03
A7 1.23 A4 1.13 F4 1.49 A4 1.23 B4 1.26 D4 1.31 D3 1.34
B7 1.35 A5 1.32 F5 1.24 B4 1.27 C4 1.26 E4 1.44 C4 1.25
C7 1.41 A6 1.54 F6 1.27 B5 1.50 C5 1.48 E5 1.25 D4 1.41  
Table 8.   Multiple-HVU scenario, defender platform mission details (Heuristic) 
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E. EXAMPLE FIVE:  CHOKE-POINT SCENARIO 
In this scenario, we seek to defend the HVU from a specific incoming direction 
(west) of an enemy SSK transiting a navigational choke-point.  We show the geography 
of this scenario in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Choke-point scenario, 4W grid geography (From Thomas, 2008) 
The attacker sends an SSK through the choke-point from left to right.  The defender 
desires to prevent the enemy SSK from crossing through the choke-point and attacking 
the HVU. 
We employ a similar defender platform set-up as Thomas, running our heuristic 
with SSN1 first set to active acoustic mode then to passive acoustic mode, shown in 








SSN1 Visible  
Table 9.   Choke-point scenario, available defender platforms 
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While utilizing SSN1 as a visible defender platform, our heuristic achieves an 
overall detection probability of 0.49 and runs in 15 seconds, compared to the optimal D-
A/D model result of 0.54 and run time of 10 seconds.  Our heuristic achieves 91% of 
optimality.  In contrast, we ran our heuristic with SSN1 as a secret defender platform and 
only achieved an overall detection probability of 0.19 after running for 26 seconds.  
Because this detection probability is significantly lower than deploying SSN1 as a visible 
defender platform, we choose the former deployment rather than the latter.  Figure 19 
shows our defender platform lay down with associated mission detail shown in Table 10.  
For comparison, we also show the D-A/D model results in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   Choke-point scenario, D-A/D model results (From Thomas, 2008) 




Figure 19.   Choke-point scenario, defender platform lay down (Heuristic) 
In this scenario, the defender platforms deploy to execute a barrier patrol between the 
HVU and the inbound enemy SSKs. 
 Surf1 m119 Helo1 m113 SSN1 m139
Active Active Active
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time
C4 1.38 B3 1.13 D3 1.48
C5 1.47 B4 1.43 E3 1.32
D4 1.15 C3 1.43 E4 1.20  
Table 10.   Choke-point scenario, defender platform mission details (Heuristic) 
F. HEURISTIC BINARY OUTPUT PHENOMENUM 
We observe a rather interesting, yet not completely unexpected, result from our 
heuristic.  In all five example problems, our heuristic exhibits a kind of ‘binary’ behavior 
in terms of overall detection probability.  Figure 20 illustrates this behavior. 
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Figure 20.   Basic scenario, objective function plot 
This plot shows the overall detection probability, as a function of iteration number, 
produced over the course of Example One.  The solid line connects successive objective 
function values as iterations proceed.  The dashed- line represents the upper envelop of 
detection probabilities (the best incumbent solution overall detection probability seen 
thus far). 
In example one, the objective function value takes on one of two values: 0.01, or a 
value proportional to the search pressure seen by the enemy SSKs.  The objective 
function oscillates back and forth between these values.  Our heuristic requires twenty-
eight iterations before it produces a defensive lay down that the enemy SSKs cannot 
completely evade.  Over the course of iterations 28 through 51, the objective function 
alternates between 0.01 (battery penalty previously discussed) and values indicating at 
least some search effort is being assigned to every enemy SSK path to the protected 
region.   
We would prefer our heuristic objective function to exhibit monotonic (i.e., non-
decreasing) behavior as it works toward optimality.  Heuristics notoriously exhibit such 
behavior, and we are not surprised that our heuristic objective function fails to do this.  
Of course, our best incumbent solution overall detection probability values seen thus far 
do exhibit monotonic behavior, thereby remaining consistent with the behavior of many 
heuristics.     
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have presented a complete Excel implementation of G-TAMP, an operational 
level decision support tool for positioning ASW defending platforms and assigning them 
missions.  Our implementation solves a Defender-Attacker/Defender (D-A/D) model in 
two overall phases.  We introduce the Alternating Flows Heuristic, which solves the 
visible defender platform sub-problem through alternating network solves between a 
network representation of potential visible ASW defender mission choices and a network 
representation of potential enemy SSK paths from the entry cells of a 4W grid to any cell 
in the protected region containing the HVU.  We solve our visible defender platform 
network through a sequence of steps; after each step, we fix the best visible defender 
platform to its assigned acoustic mode and mission, restrict the visible defender platform 
network to reflect this assignment and then solve the resulting restriction.  This process 
repeats until all visible defender platforms are assigned.  Once our heuristic assigns all 
visible defender platforms, it solves the enemy SSK sub-problem as a network shortest-
path problem minimizing detection probability from visible defender platforms along a 
single path.   
Secret defender platforms are next modeled as a two-person, zero-sum game 
(TPZSG).  Because of Excel 2007 memory allocation limitations, this step can only be 
used if a single secret defender platform (i.e., a friendly SSN) is deployed and available 
for mission tasking.  We formulate the TPZSG as a linear program and solve it via LP 
SOLVE (Berkelaar, 2009).  This suggests a “mixed strategy” of continuous probabilities 
used to produce the secret defender platform lay down and the resulting optimal attack 
paths of the enemy SSK respectively. 
The goal of this entire project is to develop a heuristic to approximately solve the 
underlying D-A/D model while running on NMCI computers with lower program run-
times than those of Thomas.  We tabulate the results from all five examples and compare 
them in Table 11. 
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Example #1 Example #2 Example #3 Example #4 Example #5 Average
0.41 0.12 0.22 0.48 0.54 0.354
0.24 0.12 0.15 0.35 0.49 0.27
59% 100% 68% 73% 91% 0.782
50 seconds 5 seconds 12 seconds 21 minutes 15 seconds 4.5 minutes






Comparison Analysis Of Heuristic G-TAMP To Original G-TAMP
 
Table 11.   Comparison analysis of heuristic G-TAMP to original G-TAMP 
From the results shown in Table 11, our heuristic algorithm implementation of G-
TAMP runs on average 800% faster (8x faster) than the original G-TAMP, produces 
solutions that are on average within 78% of optimal, and runs completely in Excel 
thereby allowing installation on NMCI computers.  Based on these results, we conclude 
that our heuristic satisfies our goal, but with less run time improvement than we 
originally predicted.  
We previously discussed the problem regarding two-dimensional array limits in 
Excel preventing use of more than one secret defender platform because total 
enumeration of potential options for two secret defender platforms, given the 8x8 4W 
grid of example four, requires more than 176,000 rows (and columns) of potential plays.  
In an attempt to circumvent this problem, we employ row and column TPZSG dominance 
rules prior to solving the TPZSG linear program.  For the purposes of our discussion, we 
define i to represent any row and j to represent any column within the TPZSG.  For our 
TPZSG where the row player desires to maximize the value of the game and the column 
player desires to minimize this value, row dominance exists if the value of each element 
in the ith row (secret defender platform potential missions) of the matrix is greater than or 
equal to each value in the i-1 row.  Conversely, column dominance exists if the value of 
each element in the jth column (enemy SSK potential attack paths) is less than or equal to 
each value in the j-1 column.  Any dominated row or column can be removed from the 
game, as it will not participate in any optimal solution (Washburn, 1994, p. 29–30).  We 
apply these dominance rules in a series of alternations between row dominance and 
column dominance, that is, our heuristic applies the row dominance rules until no more 
rows are dominated, then applies the column dominance rules until no more columns are 
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dominated, and then repeats until no more rows or columns are dominated.  Our heuristic 
maintains a listing of the dominated rows and columns and rebuilds the TPZSG with 
these removed, thus creating a “reduced” TPZSG matrix.  Our heuristic reduces the size 
of the TPZSG matrix approximately 25%; however in doing so, increases run time by 
160%.  This relatively large increase in run time that does not significantly reduce the 
size of the problem led us to reject the use of TPZSG dominance rules.  We therefore 
recommend continued research pursuant to applying TPZSG dominance rules while the 
respective algorithm builds the TPZSG matrix, thereby allowing VBA and LP SOLVE to 
solve multi-secret defender platform situations.    
The ocean-influence scenario results in Chapter III (and how they show that the 
estimate of enemy SSK cell presence probability dominates the conditional detection 
probability based on cell coverage rates, thereby dominating the overall detection 
probability of the enemy SSK.  This behavior causes visible and secret defender 
platforms to patrol in waters with poor sonar characteristics (i.e., lower coverage rates), 
which in reality lowers the overall detection probability.  If these vessels patrol in waters 
with relatively better coverage rates while still maintaining a defensive barrier around the 
HVU, the resulting overall detection probability would be greater.  Therefore, we 
recommend an objective function that places more emphasis on the conditional detection 
probability based on ocean environment (perhaps through the use of weighting factors in 
the objective function, to emphasize cell coverage rates). 
Finally, we propose incorporating our program into other decision aids such as the 
ASW Screen Planner TDA.  The ASW Screen Planner TDA requires manual and 
iterative manipulation by the planner in order to run (SWDG, 2004).  The incorporation 
of our algorithm into this program could in fact circumvent the need for constant operator 
input.  Our algorithm is not designed to replace these current decision tools (or others like 
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